11.19.25
On October 23, 2025, in Gidor v. Mangus, 2025 Pa. LEXIS 1711; 2025 LX 444890 (2025), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512 (Section 7512) of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (the Home Inspection Law), which is defined as a statute of limitations provision, in fact creates a one-year statute of repose from the date that the home inspection report is delivered. This ruling is significant, as it eliminates a claimant’s ability to file a lawsuit after the one-year limitation period has passed, even by invocation of the discovery rule or through other equitable tolling considerations.
The appellant homeowner purchased a home inspection report of the subject property on June 6, 2017. The report did not reveal any problems with the property’s structural components or foundation. A water pipe burst during the winter of 2018-2019. The plumber performing a repair of the water pipe discovered foundational problems. The homeowner sued the home inspector on August 21, 2019, over two years after the inspector delivered the home inspection report to the purchaser.
The Court began by analyzing the plain text of Section 7512, which provides:
§7512. Statute of Limitations. An action to recover damages arising from a home inspection report must be commenced within one year after the date the report is delivered. 68 Pa.C.S. § 7512.
Finding the text “plain and unambiguous,” the Court determined that the statute’s title as a statute of limitation was not dispositive, as statutory headings may serve as aids but are not determinative. Rather, to determine whether the statute constituted a statute of limitations or a statute of repose, the Court considered Section 7512 in the context of case law interpreting the plain language of the respective statutes. The Court noted that a statute of repose “delineates a defined time that begins with a definitively established event, independent of the injury or its discovery.”
In evaluating Section 7512 of the Home Inspection Law, the Court indicated that a statute of limitations “limits the time for a plaintiff to bring suit based on when a cause of action accrues.” A cause of action accrues “when an injury is inflicted and the corresponding right to institute a suit for damages arises.” On the other hand, a statute of repose “is not related to the accrual to any cause of action” because “the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered.” Instead, “[w]here a limitations period begins with a definitively established event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery thereof, the statute is considered to be one of repose.”
“The key difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose is when the clock starts running. For a statute of limitations, ‘the clock begins to run as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises.’” For a statute of repose, the Court analogized Section 7512 with the Construction Statute of Repose (42 Pa.C.S. § 5536(a)), both of which involve “the clock begin[ning] to run when the statutorily prescribed event occurs, not when the plaintiff’s claim accrues.” Notably, neither Section 7512 nor the Construction Statute of Repose contain equitable tolling considerations.
The Court concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose because it “plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” The Court held that the one-year time period running from the delivery of the home inspection report in Section 7512 is fundamentally the same as the statute of repose presented by the Construction Statute of Repose, which provides that “a civil action or proceeding brought against any person lawfully performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of any improvement to real property must be commenced within 12 years after completion of construction of such improvement to recover damages.”
Beyond providing guidance for bringing and defending claims against home inspectors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision furthers statutory interpretation emphasizing substantive text over labels or headings.
Co-author Scott Levin is a partner in the Bankruptcy & Restructuring Department. Co-author C. Quincy Conrad is an associate in the Litigation Department.