12.15.25
In Coleman v. Parkland School District, No. 33 MAP 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated summary judgment for the Parkland School District by concluding that the statute’s use of the word “or” in Section 712.1(a) is unambiguous and must be given its ordinary, disjunctive meaning.
The dispute arose after the Parkland School District amended its October 26, 2021, meeting agenda to add approval of a collective bargaining agreement that had not appeared on the posted agenda because the Parkland Education Association voted on the agreement earlier that day. The Board invoked subsection 712.1(e)—the “Majority Vote Clause”—to amend the agenda by majority vote, announced its reasons, updated the agenda and then approved the agreement. A resident challenged the action, and although the trial court upheld it, the Commonwealth Court reversed and held that the “Majority Vote Clause” in subsection (e) was only a procedural device available when one of the other three exceptions—subsections (b), (c) or (d)— also applied.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected that interpretation, emphasizing that the plain text of the statute controls and that courts may not disregard unambiguous statutory language “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that subsection (a) anticipates four separate exceptions—emergency business under subsection (b); de minimis business arising within 24 hours before the meeting under subsection (c); de minimis business raised by a resident or taxpayer during the meeting under subsection (d); and matters added to the agenda by majority vote under subsection (e). Each exception has distinct criteria, and none renders the others superfluous. Notably, subsection (e) is broader than the other exceptions but is bounded by additional transparency requirements, including a separate vote, public announcement of reasons, next-business-day posting of the amended agenda and enhanced minute-keeping under subsection (f).
Because the School District complied with subsection (e), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the Parkland School District Board of School Directors acted lawfully when it amended its agenda and approved the collective bargaining agreement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court therefore reinstated the trial court’s order. Justices Dougherty and Mundy joined the majority opinion, Justice Brobson concurred in part, and Chief Justice Todd and Justice Wecht, joined by Justice McCaffery, filed dissents.
Public bodies subject to the Sunshine Act should take this decision as a timely reminder to carefully review their meeting procedures, agenda-setting practices and internal policies to ensure full compliance with the Sunshine Act’s 24-hour notice rule and the distinct requirements of each statutory exception. Because the decision reinforces both the importance of pre-meeting transparency and the obligations that arise when an agency relies on an exception—particularly the Majority Vote Clause—agencies should evaluate how they document agenda changes, structure public explanations and capture required information in their minutes.
Understanding and navigating the intricacies of the Sunshine Act can be critical to making sure a zoning or land development application or other ancillary municipal approvals are timely acted upon by the public body and done so in conformance with applicable open meeting laws. The attorneys in Klehr Harrison’s Zoning and Land Use group can assist in navigating these complex procedural requirements throughout the course of entitling a development project.
Co-authors Matthew McHugh, partner, and Leonard Altieri, associate, are members of the Real Estate & Finance Department at Klehr Harrison.