New Jersey Supreme Court Adopts Standard for When Lawyers Owe Duty of Care to Non-Clients
In a unanimous decision with significant implications for New Jersey lawyers generally and estate planning specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court has formally adopted Sections 51(2) and (3) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers as the governing standard for when a lawyer will be found to owe a duty of care to a non-client.
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The dispute in Despina Alice Christakos v. Anthony Boyadjis, Esq., No. 090214, 2026 WL 136958 (N.J. Jan. 20, 2026), stemmed from settlement of the estates of two brothers, Peter and Nicholos Christakos. Following their deaths, Alice Christakos (the widow of their brother James) and her daughter Helen (their niece) sued the brothers’ attorney, Anthony Boyadjis, for legal malpractice. The plaintiffs alleged that Boyadjis was negligent in assisting the brothers with executing new wills in 2018, while also failing to ascertain the testamentary capacity of one of the brothers prior to executing the wills. The wills effectively reduced plaintiffs’ expected inheritance.
It was undisputed that the brothers were clients of Boyadjis, and that the plaintiffs were not. Boyadjis moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs as non-clients. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Boyadjis owed duties to both plaintiffs because they were “known potential beneficiaries of the estates” and “Boyadjis was aware that legal work in misinterpreting and drafting new Wills would reasonably affect Plaintiffs as beneficiaries.” The Appellate Division affirmed with respect to Alice Christakos, but denied that Boyadjis owed a duty to Alice’s daughter and his clients’ niece, Helen. Helen appealed.
The issue on appeal was not whether Boyadjis made mistakes (he admitted two), but whether he owed Helen any legally cognizable duty as a non-client.
In issuing its holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court first noted that situations where a lawyer may be liable to non-client third parties “ha[ve] been carefully circumscribed.” The Court recognized that it had not previously “clearly articulated the test for when an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client such that the non-client can bring an action for legal malpractice,” and formally adopts Sections 51(2) and (3) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers as the standard for determining when a lawyer owes a duty of care to a non-client, as follows:
By invitation, under Restatement § 51(2):
- Where the lawyer or (with the lawyer’s acquiescence) the lawyer’s client invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer’s opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so relies; and
- The nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection.
And by intention, under Restatement § 51(3):
- Where the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer’s services benefit the nonclient;
- Such duty would not significantly impair the lawyer’s performance of obligations to the client; and
- The absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations to the client unlikely.
The Court, however, expressly declined to adopt a broader, six-factor balancing approach used in certain other jurisdictions, finding that a balancing test would introduce unnecessary uncertainty and lead to inconsistent outcomes.
As to Helen’s claims against Boyadjis, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling, finding that Boyadjis did not owe a duty of care to Helen under either Section 51(2) or (3). Specifically, the Court found that neither of Boyadjis’ clients – the brothers – invited Helen to rely on any opinion or statement by Boyadjis, and that she did not in fact rely on any such opinion or statement – meaning that there was no duty owed to her under Restatement § 51(2)(a). Second, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence that Boyadjis knew that the brothers intended their wills to benefit Helen under Section 51(3)(a). As to Helen’s contention that the brothers’ 2018 wills should never have been executed because one of the brothers, Nicholas, lacked testamentary capacity, the Court held that the Restatement “explicitly rejects this theory as grounds for a duty in a legal malpractice case,” and that imposing such a duty could create a conflict of interest with the lawyer’s actual client and potentially discourage lawyers from assisting aged or infirm clients for fear of litigation by family members. Because Helen could not satisfy subsection 51(3)(a), the Court did not reach subsections (b) and (c).
In short, Christakos further narrows the grounds on which non-clients may pursue malpractice claims against lawyers in New Jersey. By consolidating prior case law into a coherent, state-wide framework by which such claims can be analyzed going forward, the Christakos decision should provide additional certainty and predictability for New Jersey lawyers, particularly estate planners and litigators, in assessing potential exposure to third parties.
Co-author Teri Sherman is chair of the lawyers’ professional liability and law firm services practice group, and co-author Stephen Martin is an associate in the Litigation Department at Klehr Harrison.