01.20.26
Earlier this month, the University of Washington’s quarterback, Demond Williams Jr., signed a contract with the team for the 2026-2027 season. Four days later, he announced that he was entering the NCAA transfer portal to play college football elsewhere. In response, the University of Washington indicated it had no intention of releasing Williams from his contract, describing it as a “legally binding revenue-sharing contract with the school.” While Williams has since had a change of heart and agreed to remain at Washington pursuant to his NIL deal, which exceeded $4 million, his potential departure from Washington raises questions concerning the validity of NIL and revenue-sharing agreements in the modern NIL and transfer-portal environment involving college athletes.
Notably, this is not the first instance involving an athlete transferring universities. Last year, the University of Wisconsin refused to add Xavier Lucas, a football player, to the transfer portal, hindering his ability to transfer. Nonetheless, Lucas transferred to Miami despite his revenue-sharing agreement with Wisconsin. Wisconsin sued Miami, alleging they tortiously interfered with Lucas’ contract by knowingly compelling him to break the terms of his agreement with Wisconsin. This case is currently pending in Wisconsin state court.
NIL and revenue-sharing agreements sit at the intersection of traditional contract law and a rapidly evolving regulatory environment. While universities want contractual stability, athletes want the option to transfer schools to maximize compensation. Courts have not yet articulated a consistent framework for evaluating whether these agreements are enforceable when an athlete seeks to transfer. Basic doctrines—such as whether the contract contains adequate consideration, whether its terms are sufficiently definite and whether it violates public policy—take on new meaning in a landscape where athletes can change schools multiple times without penalty. Universities may argue that these are standard commercial agreements, but athletes can counter that the agreements are inherently tied to their eligibility and participation in collegiate athletics, which complicates enforceability.
There is already skepticism surrounding these contracts, as colleges and universities have been trying to avoid recognizing athletes as employees of the institution. Yet, in insisting that NIL and revenue-sharing agreements are “legally binding” and enforceable against athletes, universities risk athletes being classified as employees. The less mobility that athletes have to transfer schools, the more these agreements will resemble employment contracts, inviting scrutiny under the law. However, to the extent the court finds that these agreements need not be honored after execution, the athletes can market themselves by signing with one university and utilizing the agreement to obtain greater pay at another institution.
The NIL and revenue-sharing landscape remains unsettled. In attempting to impose contractual stability in an environment defined by athlete mobility, universities face uncertainty as well as financial and legal consequences. Given the complexity and high stakes, universities should not rely on assumptions or historical practices when enforcing NIL or revenue-sharing agreements and should instead seek legal counsel.
Co-author Bill Matthews is co-chair of the Corporate and Securities Department, and co-author Stephanie Wolbransky Fenster is an associate in the Litigation Department. Both are members of the education practice group at Klehr Harrison.